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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1969, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)' with the objective of causing governmental agencies to consider
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environmental impact in their decision-making. Questions arose early
regarding who had standing to initiate judicial review under the Act, and
what the proper scope was for consideration of environmental effects of
agency actions. A line of cases provided some guidance regarding these
issues in the domestic context. When the same questions arose in the
context of government action having impact outside the sovereign territory
of the United States, the analysis became even more complex.
Part II of this article outlines the underlying tenets of the NEPA
and the modifications of the NEPA at the executive and administrative
level. Part III examines the judiciary's interpretations of the NEPA's
application internationally to direct government agency actions. Part IV
examines NEPA application stemming from indirect or collaborative
government action. Part V sets out a framework for analyzing the
competing factors which may affect future cases concerning the application
of NEPA abroad. Part VI concludes that until a statutory amendment is
approved, or NEPA's Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) mechanism
becomes a general principle of customary international law, the
extraterritorial application of NEPA will likely remain an open question.
Since weighing of the competing factors is the province of the judicial
branch, this will likely mean continued deference to the executive branch's
view with respect to foreign policy.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEPA INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION
A. Outline
A summary of the main issues confronted when applying NEPA
domestically is useful for considering their impact in the international
context. Under NEPA, federal agencies are required to act in an
environmentally responsible manner, 2 yet they must also comply with other
1. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-70d (West 1994).
2. Section 102(2)(c) of NEPA reads as follows:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: . . . (2) all
agencies of the federal government shall...
(c) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal
be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
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governmental policies., This cross-policy coherence obligation is especially
important with respect to agency activities abroad. As a threshold, to trigger
the necessity of an EIS a proposed federal agency action must qualify as
major and having a significant environmental impact.4
If the threshold is met, the next step is to determine the scope,
timing, and content of the EIS. The Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) regulations contain a detailed description of the procedural
requirements for the preparation of an EIS.1 To address uncertainty
surrounding the timing of any obligations under NEPA, the CEQ provides a
definition of the proposal for purposes of EIS preparation: "a proposal exists
at that stage in the development of an action when an agency subject to the
Act has a goal and is actively preparing to make a decision on one or more
alternative means of accomplishing that goal and the effects can be
meaningfully evaluated." 6
Since government action in the international sphere is susceptible to
being kept from the purview of the public, the secrecy issue is particularly
relevant when considering NEPA's application abroad. In Weinberger v.
Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project,, the United States
Supreme Court addressed the classified information issue in the domestic
context. The plaintiff challenged the government's creation of nuclear-
capable storage facilities, but because the alleged project was classified, the
plaintiffs were unable to prove the existence of an actual proposal for nuclear
weapon storage! The Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for failure to
establish a cause of action, but instructed the United States Army (Army) to
prepare a classified EIS if it was in fact storing nuclear weapons at the sites. 9
This holding creates the possibility that an agency's good faith may be the
only impetus to NEPA compliance when the underlying action implicates
national security. This holding also increases the likelihood that courts will
allow a reduced level of review of actions taken under the guise of national
security.
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Id.
3. Id. §§102-4.
4. Id. § 102(C).
5. Because of the importance of the scoping issue, the CEQ established it as a particular
element of the procedure, in order to obtain early participation by other agencies and the public.
6. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.23 (1996).
7. Weinberger v. Cath. Action of Haw. Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981).
8. Id.
9. Id.
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Once the scope analysis provides the particular matters to be included
in the EIS, the content query asks what must be discussed in relation to these
matters, and in particular, what alternatives should be included.' The test for
determining what alternatives must be considered is the rule of reason,
namely, "whether a reasonable person would think that an alternative was
sufficiently significant to warrant extended discussion."" Of significance to
the international discussion is the District of Columbia Circuit Court's ruling
that the agency discuss alternatives within the jurisdiction of any part of the
federal government, and not just that of the agency in question.' 2 The amount
of detail with which an alternative must be discussed is directly proportional
to the likelihood of its implementation." Under the CEQ regulations a no-
action alternative must be considered in the EIS," but a worst case scenario
discussion requirement was later rescinded.'"
B. Executive Order 12,114
On January 4, 1979, President Jimmy Carter issued Executive Order
12,114 in an effort to clarify the questions surrounding NEPA's international
application. 6 The order was to represent the government's "exclusive and
complete determination of the procedural and other actions to be taken by the
federal agencies to further the purpose of the National Environmental Policy
Act, with respect to the environment outside the United States, its territories
and possessions. "'1 The actions covered in the Order include major federal
actions significantly affecting the environment "of the global commons
outside the jurisdiction of any nation (e.g. the oceans or Antarctica)" or "of
a foreign nation not participating with the United States and not otherwise
involved in the action."' 9 Actions which provide the foreign nation with a
10. See40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1996).
11. NRDC, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (setting forth the test originally);
See also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, (1978) (upholding the
D.C. Circuit Court test).
12. Morton, 458 F.2d 827.
13. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2 (1996).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ABROAD OF MAJOR FEDERAL ACTIONS, 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3269, 3271 [hereinafter EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,114].
17. Id. at 3269. Under section 2, every federal agency had eight months to develop
procedures to implement the Order and were to consult with the State Department and the CEQ in
this effort. Id.
18. Id. at 3270.
19. Id.
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product or projects producing a "principal product or an emission or
effluent" which is strictly regulated or prohibited by federal law because of
its toxic effects or radioactivity are also included."0 Finally, the Order covers
major federal actions outside the United States, its territories, and possessions
which "significantly affect natural or ecological resources of global
importance" by declaration of the President or international agreement
binding on the United States.2 '
The documents acceptable in this procedure include EISs, bilateral or
multilateral studies by the United States and one or more foreign nations,
studies by an international organization or body of which the United States is
a member, and concise reviews of environmental issues, including
environmental impact assessments (EIAs), summary analyses, and other
appropriate documents." Section 2-4(b) of the Order calls for a provision in
agency procedures for document preparation according to the environmental
effects involved.2 For actions affecting the global commons, the agency
must prepare an EIS.I For the uninvolved, non-participating foreign nation
situation, and for the toxic effect and radioactivity instances described above,
bilateral or multilateral studies or concise reviews are sufficient., For the
globally important resource scenario, any of the documents mentioned above
are allowed. 26 Thus, the review's type and scope are substantially impacted
by the nature of the action and its effects, the level of coordination with the
foreign nation, and the existence of any obligations stemming from
international organization membership.
The Order also allows for "existing regulations of any agency
adopted pursuant to court order ... or judicial settlement of any case" or for
procedures in addition to those in the Order which "further NEPA's purposes
or those of other environmental laws (with specific laws listed), as long as
they are consistent with foreign and national security policies. 7 When read in
conjunction with the decision in NRDC v. Morton,2 this section seems to
imply that an individual agency's particular provisions, as long as they pass
the foreign policy/national security consistency test, will be triggered when
20. Id.
21. EXECTUTIVE ORDER 12,114 supra note 16, at 3270. Such recommendations should be
accompanied by the views of the State Department and the CEQ. Id.
22. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,114, supra note 16, at 3270.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. NRDC, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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actions have reasonable alternatives within the jurisdiction of any federal
agency.
It is significant to note the Order's Presidential action exemption:
intelligence activities and arms transfers, nuclear activities, actions arising
from membership in international organizations, and emergency relief
actions. 9 Also exempt are actions which, "in the view of the agency," do not
have a significant effect on the environment. 0 Under section 2-5(b) agencies
"may provide for" appropriate modifications in contents, timing, and
availability of documents to fellow agencies or affected nations when
necessitated by urgency, concerns of adverse impacts on foreign relations, or
sovereign responsibilities. 2 Modifications needed to reflect certain factors of
diplomacy, competitiveness, confidentiality, national security, information
collection obstacles, or ability of an agency to affect a decision are also
allowed. Indeed, in emergency circumstances and those involving
"exceptional foreign policy and national security sensitivities," an agency
procedure can even provide for exemptions and categorical exclusions beyond
those listed in the order.3' Section 2-5(d) addresses constitutional issues by
limiting section 2-5's applicability to the extent permitted by law.
Finally, section 3 eliminates the availability of a private cause of
action based on the Order. Furthermore it calls for coordination with the
State Department and, in multi-agency actions, calls on the agencies to
choose a lead agency responsible for implementation of the Order.15 The
definition of environment is restricted to the "natural and physical
environment" and expressly excludes "social, economic and other
environments." 3' Thus, unlike in the domestic context, where the Supreme
Court has not limited consideration to the natural environment, Order 12,114
appears to do just that.3" And section 3-5 seems to say that if an EIS is
prepared because an action affects the United States or the global commons, a
separate EIS need not be prepared concerning the effects of the environment
on foreign nations38
29. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,114, supra note 16, at 3271.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,114, supra note 16, at 3271.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766
(1983); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972); Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.
1972).
38. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,114, supra note 16, at 3272.
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III. NEPA APPLICATION TO DIRECT ACTION BY AGENCIES
A. Pre-Order 12,114
The first case to raise the issue of NEPA's applicability outside of the
fifty states was brought in 1973 by the people of Enewetak, an atoll which is
one of the Trust Territories of the United States. 9 The people of Enewetak
sought a preliminary injunction against the United States government's
program of nuclear blast simulation by means of high explosive detonation.4
The United States District Court of Hawaii held that NEPA did apply to the
Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands," stating that the government's drilling
and seismic studies fell within the scope of the prohibition of the preliminary
injunction requested where its primary purpose was to further the project in
dispute, and where delay would not lead to irreparable injury.'
In analyzing the statute's scope, the court noted that Congress must
"manifest an express intention" that a statute apply to the Trust Territories,
since federal legislation is not automatically applicable there. 3 The court
looked at the language of the statute and pointed out that the legislators used
the broader term of Nation, and used United States only twice, both times in
order to reference certain policies, regulations, and laws which would be
unclear without that modifier." Judge King also pointed to the expansive
language as indicating a concern for all persons subject to federal action
having a major impact on their environment and not merely those located in
the fifty states.'4 He found additional support in the statements of Senator
Jackson, NEPA's principal sponsor, as well as in the Senate Conference
Committee Report."6 The court also cited the House Report as evidence of
Congressional recognition of the worldwide scope inherent in environmental
problems: "[i]mplicit in [U.S. Environmental Policy] is the understanding
that the international implications of our current activities will also be
considered, inseparable as they are from the purely national consequences of
our actions. "4 7
39. People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811 (D.C. Haw. 1973).
40. Id. at 813.
41. Id. at 815.
42. Id. at 820-21.
43. Id. at 815.
44. Id. at 816.
45. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811, 816.
46. Id. at 817.
47. Id. at 817-18.
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In Sierra Club v. Adams,' the plaintiff environmental group sought to
enjoin the United States construction of the Darien Gap Highway in Panama
and Colombia, alleging that the environmental impact statement was
deficient. 9 The Supreme Court agreed on the issue of the plaintiff's standing
to challenge the EIS based upon concern regarding the spread of aftosa, or
foot and mouth disease, to the United States, and that once standing is found
with respect to one ground, a plaintiff may raise other challenges to the EIS
based upon the public interest in having government officials meet their
duties under NEPA.10 The Supreme Court noted the distinction between the
issues of NEPA applicability to United States' government projects which
involve entirely local environmental impacts, projects with some strictly local
impacts, and some which affect the United States.,' But the Court held that
based on the facts present in Sierra Club, it need only assume NEPA's
applicability to the construction in Panama, and deferred the resolution of the
issue of NEPA applicability to projects with "strictly local impacts." 2
In addressing the adequacy issue, the Court noted that the draft EIS
had been circulated to over seventy officials in the United States, Panama,
and Colombia, and neither the CEQ nor the Environmental Protection
Agency(EPA) raised any objections to the statement." The Court also noted
the significance of the government's response to the adverse comments to the
draft, the level of detail in the discussion concerning aftosa, and the
exploration of alternatives in ruling that the statement met its NEPA
requirements. But the Court's green light was conditioned upon the
Department of Agriculture filing a certification concerning the aftosa control
issue with the court and the appellees before any construction began in
Colombia." The Court found this necessary because the government
appeared too anxious to complete the project. 6  Apparently in the
Congressional Budget request for Fiscal Year 1979 the "certain
environmental requirements" which led to the delay in the Darien Gap
Highway project were described as "[having] been met" despite the fact that
48. Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. 1978).
49. Id. at 390.
50. Id. at 391-92.
51. Id. at 392.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 393-94.
54. Adams, 578 F.2d 389, 394-97.
55. Id. at 397.
56. Id.
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no final decision had been made by the Court on the case when the document
was sent to Congress. 7
In the second 1978 case concerning NEPA's application abroad, the
National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) sought a
declaratory judgment that the government violated NEPA by failing to
prepare an EIS with respect to a joint program of herbicide spraying of
marijuana and poppy plants in Mexico.,8 The plaintiff group alleged that
Mexican grown marijuana consumed in the United States was found to
contain significant levels of the herbicide paraquat, and that this posed a
"serious health hazard" to some of their members who smoke marijuana or
ingest it in food or drink. 9 NORML also claimed that some of its members
visited Mexico for "recreational and professional purposes" and had an
interest in having the food and drink they consume there free from potentially
harmful herbicides. In addition, the plaintiffs asserted a "recreational and
aesthetic interest" that the areas of scenic beauty in Mexico not be harmed by
herbicide usage.60 Finally, the group claimed they had an interest in having
Mexican agricultural imports free from potentially harmful herbicides.6 ' The
United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that at least
some of plaintiffs members had satisfied the minimal standing requirements
set out in Sierra Club v. Adams,6 2 and had at the very least alleged a sufficient
informational interest under NEPA. 6
The court noted that the extraterritoriality of NEPA was still an open
question in the Circuit." But since the defendant agreed to prepare an EIS
regardless of the outcome of the litigation, the Court, as in Sierra Club, did
not have to directly address the issue. 6  The court refused to issue an
injunction requiring the agencies to use their best efforts to dissuade the
Mexican government from continuing the spraying program until the EIS was
prepared, holding this to be a nonjusticiable political question beyond its
powers, and that such relief would infringe upon the foreign relations powers
of the President." The court noted that marijuana and heroin (also affected
by the program) were Schedule I Controlled Substances and that simple
57. Id.
58. National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. U.S. Dep't. of
St., 452 F. Supp. 1226 (1978).
59. Id. at 1228.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1228-29.
62. Adams, 578 F. 2d 389.
63. NORML, 452 F. Supp. 1226, 1230.
64. Id. at 1232.
65. Id. at 1229, 1232-33.
66. Id. at 1234-35.
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possession was a criminal violation.6' Thus, even though NEPA demanded
that federal agencies not rush blindly into major federal actions affecting the
environment, this did not mean that environmental concerns could justify
disregarding the criminal laws created by Congress.6 Because of this and the
fact that the relief sought presented a nonjusticiable political question, all
other aspects of the relief sought by NORML were denied.69
B. Post-Order 12,114
Two years later, an environmental group sought judicial review of
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) approval of nuclear export
applications to the Philippines.0 The petitioners challenged the adequacy of
the review under both the Atomic Energy Act and NEPA." The NRC relied
extensively on generic analyses, Philippine EISs submitted, and other
environmental review information compiled under Executive Order 12,114.2
Officials also stated that principles of national sovereignty constrained them
from insisting on visits to the local sites, such that it did not need to examine
site-specific impacts on the global commons." The Commission also pointed
to several specific efforts undertaken with the Philippines in order to carry
out the NEPA requirement that an agency "maximize international
cooperation" to prevent deterioration of the worldwide environment. 74
The court characterized the NEPA dispute as a legal question
between the plaintiffs claim that NEPA should apply to the foreign effects of
a domestic licensing decision, and the government's response that the
requirement of an EIS, to the fullest extent possible, was narrowly limited to
major federal actions taking place in, or having effects upon, the United
States itself.75 Judge Wilkey referred to the legitimate overlapping of the
regulatory jurisdiction of the United Sates and the Philippines, but remarked
that they were not the same.7 6 While noting that the nature of the program as
one of energy provision made the foreign political interest significant, the
court also said that the "common defense and security" and the "international
67. NORML, 452 F. Supp. 1226, 1234.
68. Id. at 1324.
69. Id. at 1235.
70. NRDC, Inc. v. NRC, 647 F.2d 1345 (1981).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1366.
74. Id. at 1353.
75. NRDC, 647 F.2d 1353, 1355. The opinion contains a parallel analysis of the government's
obligations under the NEPA.
76. Id. at 1356.
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reputation" of the United States were "on the line."" Also of significance
was the court's view that the rule against extraterritoriality, when interpreting
a statute, justified the NRC's refusal to extend the scope of the review to the
impact on American military personnel stationed in the Philippines. 8
Judge Wilkey of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that
the Commission had acted properly by declining to consider the foreign
impact, and that its deference to the executive's analysis and foreign policy
judgment was "fully consistent" with congressional objectives.79  More
specifically, the court was not able to find that NEPA imposed a requirement
for an EIS where the impact fell exclusively within foreign jurisdictions., In
analyzing the language of the statute, the court felt that deference to the
Presidential authority in foreign relations dictated that NEPA's putative
extraterritorial reach be curbed with respect to nuclear exports.8' The court
concluded that NEPA's legislative history revealed nothing about
extraterritorial application, and that the line of precedent was distinguishable
from the case at hand, such that the holding was entirely consistent with the
NEPA jurisprudence to date. 82 Judge Wilkey did restrict the NEPA holding
to a finding that NEPA was inapplicable to NRC nuclear export licensing
decisions, but that did not necessarily mean that the EIS requirement was
inapplicable to some other types of major federal actions abroad. 3
In Greenpeace v. Stone," a coalition of environmental groups and
individuals contested the government's transportation of the chemical
weapons from West Germany to Johnston Atoll for ultimate destruction.
The United States District Court of Hawaii refused the requested preliminary
injunction. The court held that the Army's environmental impact statement
met its obligations under NEPA, and that any interference with the
stockpiles, which were already in transit, posed serious risks to both people
and the environment. 6 Furthermore the court ruled that the transportation of
the weapons within the Federal Republic of Germany did not fall within
NEPA's scope because the action was pursuant to a presidential agreement
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1364-65.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. NRDC, 647 F.2d 1353, 1364-65.
82. Id. at 1368.
83. Id. at 1366.
84. Greenpeace v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D.C. Haw. 1990).
85. Id. at 755.
86. Id. at 754.
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between President Bush and Chancellor Kohl.8 Additionally, the court ruled
that the government's failure to consider the transoceanic shipment segment
of the project in the same comprehensive EIS as regarding the eventual
incineration did not constitute a NEPA violation.u
In the decision, Judge Ezra pointed to the unique nature of the
challenged federal action extending from the Federal Republic of Germany to
Johnston Atoll.89  The plaintiffs' standing was complicated by the
geographical nexus requirement of the Ninth Circuit, especially the
transoceanic portion of the program.9 Plaintiff Walter Paulo, a Hawaiian
native, stated that "he fished in the vicinity" of the Johnston Atoll and will
likely be affected by the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal
System(JACADS) project." 9' The court saw this fact as conferring upon
Paulo standing to challenge the weapons storage and destruction on the
Johnston Atoll, but that he was without standing to challenge the weapons
movement within Germany, or across international waters.9 Plaintiff
Greenpeace International claimed members within Germany, and in particular
those along the stockpile transport route, would likely satisfy the procedural
and geographical nexus test.93 But despite the group's claims of members
residing throughout the world, the court considered it "impossible [to]
conclusively presume" whether any members were geographically in the
vicinity or would potentially be affected since the actual shipment route had
not yet been determined.94
The court noted that despite the complexities in the analysis of
standing, in ruling on the motion, it could still rule on whether substantial
questions had been raised on the merits and whether the balance of hardships
favored granting relief.9' The first NEPA claim was that the Army's
segmentation of the project and failure to develop a comprehensive EIS
violated the Army's statutory duties.9 The Court opined that NEPA did not
87. Id. at 757-58. Plaintiffs disputed the existence of an actual agreement. The court, while
recognizing that no written agreement was actually executed between Bush and Kohl, still found
sufficient evidence to show that Secretary of State Baker did enter an actual agreement with
Chancellor Kohl on behalf of President Bush. Id.
88. Id. at 763.
89. Stone, 748 F. Supp 749, 756.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 756-57.
94. Id. at 757. Cf. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Ed. Project, 454 U.S. 139
(1981).
95. Greepeace v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D.C. Haw. 1990).
96. Id. at 757.
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apply extra-territorially to the movement within Germany and shipment to the
Johnston Atoll. This conclusion was based largely on the political question
and foreign policy implications which would result from applying "a United
States statute to joint actions taken on foreign soil based on an agreement
made between the President and a foreign head of state. "' While it noted the
Executive Order 12,114 requirement that federal agencies consider
environmental impacts of actions undertaken outside sovereign United States
territory, the court pointed out that the assessment requirement only exists
when the "foreign nation [was] not participating with the United States and
[was] not otherwise involved in the action." 8 The court pointed out that the
plaintiffs' reliance on CEQ comments regarding application of NEPA abroad
was misplaced. Not only did they predate Order 12,114, but the CEQ
worked with the State Department in drafting the Order "in a way sensitive to
both environmental and foreign policy concerns.""
The court did not favorably consider the second NEPA claim that the
Army failed to adequately consider alternatives.100 The court found that the
Army's consideration of alternatives was sufficient, even though it recognized
that the facility on the Johnston Atoll was, at that time, the only incinerator of
its kind capable of destroying the weapons in question.'°' Also, the no-action
alternative and interim storage or disposal in the United States, mentioned in
the Supplementary Impact Statement(SEIS), were not real options in light of
the Presidential agreement and of a law passed by Congress which had
specifically prohibited the Army from shipping a similar stockpile from
Okinawa to the continental United States. '°2 The plaintiffs had pointed to
biodegradation or chemical treatment methods as feasible alternatives, but the
court found the Army's incorporation by reference of such methods sufficient
under NEPA. 03
97. Id. It is worth noting that the court emphasized the fact that this decision was limited to the
specific and unique facts presented by the case. The court felt that under different circumstances,
NEPA may require a federal agency to prepare an EIS for an action undertaken abroad, in particular
if the action would have direct environmental impacts within the United States, or when there has
been a total lack of environmental assessment by the agency or by the foreign country. Id. at 761.
98. Id. at 761.
99. Id. at 763.
100. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 764.
101. Id. at 764.
102. Id. Congress passed Public Law 91-672 to specifically prohibit the movement of the
Army's stockpile at Okinawa to the continental United States. In response the Army shipped those
chemical munitions to the Johnston Atoll without any Congressional interference. Thus while the law
is not a direct ban on such shipments, the Army raised the issue to highlight the similar political
problems which could arise from an attempt to bring the European stockpile to the continental United
States. Id. at 764 n.20.
103. Id. at 764.
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The third NEPA claim, that the Army violated NEPA by failing to
supplement the final SEIS in light of alleged new infonnation, was without
merit. The information presented apparently was not new, the argument was
simply a derivation of the alternatives claim.'"
Also, in 1990, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decided a case
which had major implications for plaintiffs suing under environmental
statutes.10 Defenders of Wildlife and other groups challenged a Department
of Interior regulation which provided that the Endangered Species Act did not
create a duty for federal agencies funding projects in foreign countries to
consult with the Secretary of Interior about the project's likely impacts on
endangered species. °'0 The court found the injury in fact requirement was met
on two grounds. First, that the rate of extinction of endangered species was
on the rise in countries visited by its members which were also the site of
specific agency products. Second, the Secretary's refusal to complete
(project review) statutory procedures constituted a violation.107 Judge Gibson
held that the organizations had standing to challenge the regulation, and that
the consultation requirement in the Endangered Species Act extended to all
agency action affecting endangered species, whether within the United States
or abroad."18
Though not a NEPA case, Defenders highlights the importance of the
judicial interpretation of a statute's legislative history. This case also stresses
the importance of a sufficient nexus between the government's activity and
the alleged injury to the plaintiff. One of the plaintiffs visited parts of Sri
Lanka which were sites of development projects funded by the Agency for
International Development (AID).1°9 Another plaintiff went to Egypt and
observed the Nile crocodile habitat which coincided with the huge Aswan
High Dam construction project. 10 Both plaintiffs noted their intent to return
to those areas, and the court found they had standing.", The court felt that
the Defenders members had provided specific facts and not merely use of
"unspecified portions of immense tracts of land upon which governmental
104. Id. at 765.
105. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (1990) (8"' Cir 1990)
106. Id. at 117-18.
107. Id. at 119.
108. Id. at 125. The court found that the statute defined endangered species without any
reference to geographic limitations. The court also noted a section entitled, "International
Cooperation" as evidencing a Congressional commitment to worldwide conservation efforts. NEPA
also has such a section. It emphasized that final authority with respect to statutory construction lies
with the judiciary, which must reject any agency interpretations which it finds contrary to clear
congressional intent. Id. at 123.
109. Id. at 120.
110. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 120.
111. Id.
[Vol. 4:1
Carroll
activity may or may not occur."112 Another plaintiff, however, did not have
standing relating to a construction project in Peru because he only came
within a few hundred miles of the area.' 3
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey,' the plaintiff
environmental group sought to enjoin the National Science Foundation's
program of food related and domestic waste incineration in the Antarctic
because it had failed to prepare a proper environmental analysis in violation
of NEPA, the CEQ Regulations, and Executive Order 12,114."' The United
States District Court made a rather clear statement regarding the extra-
territorial application of NEPA by stating it could not "ferret out a clear
expression of Congress' intention that NEPA should apply beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States. "16 The court relied substantially
on a 1991 Supreme Court decision that Congressional legislation is meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, unless a
clear contrary intent is shown." In construing that case, the court ruled that
it had no choice but to decide that NEPA was inapplicable to the NSF
incineration program in Antarctica." 8 In applying Executive Order 12,114,
the court noted that, based on case law, executive orders without specific
foundation in congressional action are not judicially enforceable in private
civil suits." 9 As a note of caution, however, the court noted its concern with
the manner in which the defendant undertook the EIS, and remarked that if it
had subject matter jurisdiction under NEPA or Order 12,114, the result may
have been different.' 0
IV. NEPA APPLICATION TO INDIRECT UNITED STATES ACTION
ABROAD
The United States is involved in many activities in other countries by
nature of its membership in various international organizations. Sometimes
these efforts are in conjunction with certain programs of administrative
112. This was a reference to the failed challenge in Nat. Wildlife Fed. v. Lujan, 110 S.Ct.
3177, 3187-89 (1990).
113. Id.
114. Env. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 772 F. Supp. 1296 (D.C. 1991).
115. Id. at 1297.
116. Id. at 1297. This statement is difficult to reconcile with the passage quoted from the Laird,
case, 353 F. Supp. at 817-18.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1298.
119. Massey, 772 F. Supp. 1296, 1298. The court based this conclusion on the holdings in In re
Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 627 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1980) and Manhattan-Bronx Postal
Union v. Gronouski, 450 F.2d 451 (D.C. 1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
120. Massey, 772 F. Supp. 1296.
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agencies, raising the issue of the extent that NEPA obligations attach to such
joint or parallel activities. Also, many of the international organizations now
have their own requirements with respect to environmentally sound planning,
which are similar but not equivalent to NEPA's requirements. NEPA
section 4332(2)(f) expressly refers to international activities by calling on
agencies to recognize the worldwide and long-range character of
environmental problems and to support [appropriate] initiatives, resolutions,
and programs designed to maximize international cooperation in anticipating
and preventing a decline in the quality of [humankind's] world environment.
A. United States Bilateral Assistance
This is the primary type of United States government assistance to
foreign governments and institutions.'"' It consists of the transfer of financial
and/or technical assistance by governmental agencies, most of which is
coordinated by the AID, an independent organization within the State
Department. 2  After a series of AID projects caused unforeseen negative
environmental consequences in recipient nations,In the Agency improved its
environmental review procedures along the lines of the NEPA model. 2  Even
so, NEPA procedures need only be fully implemented if the AID action
affects the environment of the United States, the global commons, or areas
outside the jurisdiction of any nation.'25 In other words, projects having only
local effects will be subject to a different standard of review.
AID projects falling within this category are governed by Regulation
16, which differs from NEPA in three main respects. 26 First, the Initial
Environmental Examination (lEE), in contrast to NEPA's Environmental
Assessment (EA) procedure, only requires a brief discussion of foreseeable
environmental effects of the action.'27 A discussion of alternatives, including
the no-action alternative, is not required, nor is any participation by the
121. See David Young, The Application of Environmental Impact Statements to United States
Participation in Multinational Development Projects, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 309 (1992).
122. Id.
123. The Center for Development Information and Evaluation reviewed over 200 AID projects
between 1985 and 1986, and reported that 20 percent of the projects had unforeseen environmental
impacts, and of these, most were negative and were not adequately addressed. Siew Tuan Chew,
Environmental Assessments of Development Projects: A Preliminary Evaluation of AID's Experience,
AID EVALUATION OCCASIONAL PAPER 17 (1988).
124. Gary M. Emsdorff, The Agency for International Development and NEPA: A Duty
Unfidfilled, 67 WASH. L. REv. 133 (1992).
125. Id.
126. See Susan K. Selph, Potential Rami fications of Environmental Defense v. Massey
Illustrated by an Evaluation of United States Agency for International Development Environmental
Procedures, 17 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L. 123 (1993).
127. Id.
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public required in the IEE preparation process. 28 Second, the scope and
content of the IEE, which is to include "the direct and indirect effects of the
project on the environment," is much less detailed than the guidance provided
by the CEQ Regulations.' 29  Finally, the IEE is not circulated for public
comment; only the draft EIS receives public input. 30
B. Multilateral Development Banks
Imposing the relatively stringent requirements under NEPA to
projects undertaken by multilateral banks of which the United States is a
member is complicated by the differing national views with respect to the
environment. Three main factors account for this difficulty: 1) the absence
of a national mechanism suitable to the activities of the banks; 2) the inherent
infringement on the sovereignty of the recipient nation; and 3) the increased
complexity of international development projects.,', But in some situations
the centralized authority of institutions such as the World Bank may actually
facilitate the EIA procedure relative to the United States federal
bureaucracy. '"
In response to a series of environmental disasters resulting from some
of its projects, the World Bank initiated a new policy of environmentally
conscious development in May 1984. " When critics claimed that the policy
was ineffective and merely a public relations ploy, the Bank issued a directive
mandating an EIA for all projects which may have significant environmental
impacts.3 4  But under the Directive, the EIA requirement did not apply to
128 Id.
129. Id.
130. Susan K. Selph, Potential Ramifications of Environmental Defense v. Massey Illustrated by
an Evaluation of United States Agency for International Development Environmental Procedures, 17
WM. & MARY J. ENvTL. L. 123 (1993).
131. See Carole Klein-Chesivoir, Avoiding Environmental Injury: The Case for Widespread
Use of Environmental Impact Assessments in International Development Projects, 30 VA. J. INT'L L.
517 (1990).
132. Id. at 529-35.
133. Id. at 531. In the World Bank project cycle, the EIA process would function as follows.
During the identification phase, environmentally trained bank experts conduct a sectoral analysis in
cooperation with local experts. In the preparation phase, during which project objectives and
timetables are outlined, the identification of potential adverse environmental impacts continues.
These first two stages are the responsibility of the borrower. During the appraisal stage, the Bank
reviews technical, institutional, economic and financial aspects of the project. At this stage Bank
officials balance the short-term resource to use and long-term productivity, and identify any
irretrievable commitment of resources. This is meant to result in an environmentally sensitive cost-
benefit analysis of the project. Id. at 535-36.
134. World Bank Operational Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment. The Bank also
publishes an Environmental Assessment Sourcebook which compiles all of the Bank's environmental
policies and guidelines.
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projects which can be characterized as environmentally beneficial, leaving the
determination thereof to Bank officials. In part to address this issue, in 1989,
Congress passed the International Development and Finance Act, 35 which
prohibits American representatives of any international bank from voting for
any development project unless an EIA has been performed.16 This would
mean a statement following the guidelines set by the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), and not NEPA.'37
C. The United Nations
The United States and other developed countries provide most of the
funding for the development assistance programs of the United Nations."'
The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in
Stockholm led to the creation of the UNEP.'3 9 UNEP was developed to
create an action plan for the implementation of a set of environmental
principles signed by 113 nations, and also to coordinate future United Nations
activities concerning the environment.'14 UNEP encourages the development
and use of the environmental impact assessment mechanism for all of its
projects.''
The significance of the sustainable development issue is reflected in
the drafting of the United Nations Convention on the Environmental Impact
Assessment in a Transboundary Context.'12  The Convention calls for
countries to "[establish] an environmental impact assessment procedure that
permits public participation and preparation of the environmental impact
assessment documentation."' 4 3  The content requirements under the
Convention bear a strong resemblance to NEPA, and include a description of
the project and purpose, reasonable alternatives, the environment affected,
the estimation of the significance of impact, mitigation measures, and criteria
135. David Young, The Applicatiqn of Enviromental Impact Statements to United States
Participation in Multinational Development Projects, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 309 (1992).
136. Id. at 323; 22 C.F.R. § 161.7 (1996).
137. Id. at 323.
138. Id. at 314.
139. See THE EARTH SUMMIT: THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT (UNCED) 3-10 (Graham & Trotman 1992).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. U.N. Convention on the Environmental Assessment Impact in a Tansboundary Context,
Feb. 25, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 800 [hereinafter U.N. Convention on E.I.A.]. The Convention was
approved at a conference in Espoo (Finland) in 1991, but is not yet in force.
143. U.N. Convention on E.I.A., supra note 142, art. 2-2.
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guidelines.'" The appropriate authorities in "parties of origin"" should
provide this documentation to "affected parties" 1'" for comments within a
reasonable time before a final decision is to be made on a proposed activity. '14
Although the Convention is not yet in force, the fact that the EIA serves as
the subject of a United Nations sponsored international agreement is strong
evidence that the development of an EIA statement will eventually be
considered as a general principle of customary international law.'4 8
Consequently, such an obligation may someday be imputed to countries by
nature of developments in the international legal arena.
144. U.N. Convention on E.I.A, supra note 142, app. II, 30 I.L.M. at 814-15: These
following requirements are listed in Appendix II, Content of the Environmental Impact Assessment
Documentation, which reads:
Information to be included in the environmental impact assessment documentation
shall, at a minimum, contain, in accordance with Article 4:
(a) A description of the proposed activity and its purpose;
(b) A description, where appropriate, of reasonable alternatives (for example,
locational or technological) to the proposed activity and also the no-action alternative;
(c) A description of the environment likely to be significantly affected by the
proposed activity and its alternatives;
(d) A description of the potential environmental impact of the proposed activity and
its alternatives and an estimation of its significance;
(e) A description of mitigation measures to keep adverse environmental impact to a
minimum;
(f) An explicit indication of predictive methods and underlying assumptions as well
as the relevant environmental data used;
(g) An identification of gaps in knowledge and uncertainties encountered in
compiling the required information;
(h) Where appropriate, an outline for monitoring and management programmes and
any plans for post-project analysis; and
(i) A non-technical summary including a visual presentation as appropriate (maps,
graphs, etc.).
145. U.N. Convention on E.I.A., supra note 141, art. l(ii), 30 I.L.M. at 802. "Parties of
origin" are defined in the Convention as Contracting Parties (to the Convention) or "[p]arties to this
Convention under whose jurisdiction a proposed activity is envisaged to take place." Id. art. I(ii).
146. "Affected parties" are defined as Contracting Parties (to the Convention) or "[p]arties to
this Convention likely to be affected by the transboundary impact of a proposed activity." U.N.
Convention on E.I.A., supra note 142, art. 1(iii), 30 I.L.M. at 806.
147. U.N. Convention on E.I.A., supra note 142, art. 4, 30 I.L.M. at 806.
148. Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice defines an international
custom as "a general practice accepted as law." Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38
(1)(b). THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §102(2) (1987) states: "Customary
international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation." Thus state practice is key in determining whether a particular custom rises
to the level of international customary law. The significance lies in the fact that neither federal
statutes nor executive orders can contradict a self-executing custom, since these become automatically
a part of the United States federal common law. Frederic L. Kirgis, Federal Statutes, Executive
Orders and Self-Executing Custom, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 371 (1987).
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V. ANALYSIS: MAPPING THE NEPA EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION TERRAIN
The panoply of United States case law, international organization
policies, and regional and international conventions presents a very
complex picture for analyzing the extraterritorial application of NEPA.
Because of disparities in approach, application, interpretation, and
enforcement of the various environmental planning policies mentioned in
this paper, there may still exist incentives to characterize a given activity
so as to bring it within the scope of a desired environmental regime. Some
of the nuances of this analysis are presented below.
A. The Potential for De-Internationalization
In the domestic context, the federal action element in a project may
take the form of a license requirement, funding restrictions, or some other
type of federal participation. 4 9 If only a minor part of a project falls within
federal control, the small handle doctrine states that only impacts stemming
from those minor parts are covered by NEPA. 1' ° Parties would sometimes
attempt to structure a project in order to defederalize it, partially or entirely.
The courts have not looked favorably on such attempts."' Even when an
action involves a nonfederal defendant, at least one court has upheld an
injunction against a private party, where prior approval of a federal agency
was a sine qua non of the initiation and continuance of a non-federal action. 2
149. The CEQ Regulations read, in relevant parts:
Major federal action includes actions with effects that may be major and which
are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility. Major reinforces but does
not have a meaning independent of significantly (1508.27). Actions include the
circumstances where the responsible officials fail to act and that failure to act is
reviewable by courts or administrative tribunals under the Administrative Procedure
Act or other applicable law as agency action.
Actions include new and continuing activities, including projects and programs
entirely or partly financed, assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved by federal
agencies; new or revised agency rules, regulations, plans, policies, or procedures; and
legislative proposals (1506.8, 1508.17). Actions do not include funding assistance
solely in the form of general revenue sharing funds, distributed under the State and
Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C.A. § 1221 et seq., with no Federal
Agency control over the subsequent use of such funds. Actions do not include
bringing judicial or administrative civil or criminal enforcement actions.
40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1996).
150. See, e.g., Macht v. Skinner, 916 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
151. See San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Tex. Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied 406 U.S. 933 (1972); Scottsdale Mall v. Ind., 549 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied 434 U.S. 1008 (1978).
152. Found. on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 155 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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There is no case law regarding attempts to segment an international
project involving federal agency participation. But certain activities, for
example international construction projects, are potential candidates for
segmentation. If a United States court followed the reasoning in the domestic
defederalization cases, conflicts could arise from any attempts to apply NEPA
to activities in which the United States is not the only participant.
B. Substitutability of Foreign and Multinational Assessments to Meet
NEPA Requirements
A related issue in the bilateral project situation is the extent to which
EIAs or EISs developed by a foreign government or agency may be
substituted for the United States agency's EIAs or EISs. United States courts
have already touched upon this issue in two cases. In NRDC v. NRC, 5 the
District Court for the District of Columbia noted that the federal agency had
cooperated on several specific programs in order to comply with the NEPA
section 102(2)(f)'s requirement that agencies "maximize international
cooperation" to prevent deterioration of the worldwide environment."4  The
government of the Philippines filed an amicus brief to assure the court that it
had "responsibly undertaken to assess and protect the Philippines
environment from the risks associated with the import of the nuclear
reactor."' 5 The brief stated that NRC consideration of impacts in the
Philippines would improperly "substitut[e] United States regulatory standards
for the Republic's own," and that refusal of the license on the grounds raised
by petitioners would constitute an unwarranted intrusion into its internal
affairs.1 6  In Greenpeace v. Stone,"' the District Court acknowledged the
decision of a German court addressing a challenge to the transport of
chemical weapons within the Federal Republic. 8 The Administrative Court
of Cologne analyzed that claim under two statutes specifically covering
chemical weapons transport on German territory. 9 In reviewing the opinion,
153. NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d 1345 (1981).
154. Id. at 1354.
155. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Republic of the Philippines, at 23, NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d
1345 (1981).
156. Id.
157. Greepeace v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D.C. Haw. 1990).
158. Eric Neumayer v. die BRD, VG Koeln, 4 Kammer, 4 L 1098/90.
159. The rail transport segment of the project was covered by the Verordnung ueber die
innerstaatliche und grenzueberschreitende Befoerderung gefaehrlicher Gueter mit Eisenbahnen
(GGVE) [Regulation concerning the domestic and cross-border movement of dangerous items by
train], v. 1985 (BGBI. I s. 1560). The road transport segment was covered by the Verordnung ueber
die innerstaatliche und grenzueberschreitende Befoerderung gefaehrlicher Gueter auf Strassen
(GGVS), v. 1985 (BGBI. I s. 1550).
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Judge Ezra noted that the request for injunctive relief was denied by the
German court, which found the transport operation consistent with the
applicable West German law.'"0 He remarked that to impose NEPA's
requirements to that operation would "encroach upon the jurisdiction of the
[Federal Republic of Germany] to implement a political decision which
necessarily involved a delicate balancing of risks to the environment and the
public and the ultimate goal of expeditiously ridding West Germany of
obsolete unitary chemical munititions."161
It would seem that when an American court is faced with such a
scenario, four alternatives exist. The first, when available, would be to find a
sufficient ground for applying NEPA which addresses the foreign policy
sensitivity problem (e.g. argue that the potential effects on American service
persons in the Philippines and Germany require application). 62 The second
would be for a court to review, or to order an agency to review, the affected
nation's environmental planning procedures and determine whether they are
sufficient to satisfy NEPA's requirements. This might at least reduce any
negative foreign policy reverberations compared to the outright preemption
alternative. It would, however, place a possibly greater administrative
burden on the agency (or court) than would ordering the routine NEPA, EIA,
or EIS. The third alternative is for the agency to work with the local officials
and thereby ensure that NEPA-type standards for statements were met. Some
commentators argue that this approach would have positive foreign policy
consequences and would enhance the local environmental regime. 163
Detractors argue just the opposite. Such cooperation would be viewed as
paternalistic meddling and also point to the increased costs which this
approach would entail.'," Finally, the court could simply defer to the foreign
EIA or EIS and follow a presumption of sufficiency approach. A sliding-scale
evaluation here would run the risk of insulting foreign nations perceived as
maintaining inadequate environmental policies, while complete deference
160. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 760 (1990).
161. Id.
162. Interestingly enough, this was argued in the Philippines case, but the court stated that "the
rule against extraterritoriality [of a statute] is applied here to justify the Commission's refusal to
assimilate the American public in America to American armed forces in the Philippines [or in the
many other places around the globe where the United States has military personnel]." NRDC v.
NRC, 647 F.2d 1345, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1980). This rationale is somewhat curious in light of the
holding in the Defenders case.
163. See M. Diane Barber, Bridging the Environmental Gap: The Application of NEPA to the
Mexico-United States Bilateral Trade Agreement, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 429 (1992).
164. Scott C. Whitney, Should the National Environmental Policy Act Be Extended to Major
Federal Decisions Significantly Affecting the Environment of Foreign States and the Global
Commons?, 1 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 431 (1990).
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could increase the risk of some of the problems, including disasters, which
the statement is meant to aid in avoiding.
C. The Blurring of NEPA
At first glance, it appears that Executive Order 12,114 aims to
occupy the field with respect to the extraterritorial application of NEPA. The
wording of many of the provisions of the Order are troublesome when
applied to actual agency actions abroad. In relation to the actions included
under the order, it is difficult to imagine a situation where a foreign nation's
cooperation or communication with a United States agency would be so
minimal as to qualify it as "not participating" or "not otherwise involved.""'
The discretion left to the agency in determining actions not having a
significant effect on the foreign environment raises questions about what it
must do to backup such a determination. The apparently liberal
substitutability of documents in sections 2-4 raises the possibility of deviation
from the NEPA/CEQ requirements. The lead agency mechanism,
authorization of agency modification regarding contents and timing of the
statement, and the exclusion of "social, economic and other environments"
from consideration all raise the issue of whether this can be done legitimately
by executive order.'" Since the scope of the Order represents the
government's "exclusive and complete determination of the procedural and
other actions" of agencies,167 and does not create a cause of action,' it must
be read to the extent it is consistent with NEPA, whose policy goals it is
meant to further.
So far courts have not viewed the Order as preempting application of
NEPA to all federal agency actions outside of the United States.' 69 In the
Greenpeace case, the court relied on the NEPA statute itself, and gave little
attention to the Order in the holding or in dicta.76 Some commentators
attribute this to the lack of a statutory basis for the Order, and the lack of a
framework upon which courts could rely."'
Other developments have led to the decreased likelihood that NEPA
will be applied equally, or even at all, in the international sphere. These
include express exemptions from NEPA coverage and the primacy of foreign
165. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12, 114, supra note 16.
166. Order 12,114 perhaps anticipated these issues by its limiting applicability of its provisions
as "permitted by law." Id.
167. Id. at 3269.
168. Id.
169. See M. Diane Barber, (citing Greenpeace v. Stone case).
170. Id.
171. Id.
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policy considerations in the administrative agency scheme. On both the
multinational institution and agency level, commentators warn of the inherent
project biases which exist once action on a proposal is taken which may
prevent any post facto evaluation. This is particularly problematic given the
traditional grand scale on which many of the development projects have been
undertaken.
D. Judicial Balancing of Competing Objectives
Post-Executive Order 12,114 courts have tended to rely on a
balancing of NEPA's goals with the particular foreign policy concerns arising
from the federal action at hand. 7 2 In particular, when a NEPA plaintiff seeks
an injunction, even courts acknowledging environmental concerns may be
forced by equity considerations to favor foreign policy implications. The
court in Wisconsin v. Weinbergert7" held:
NEPA cannot be construed to elevate automatically its
procedural requirements above all national considerations.
Although there is no national defense exception to NEPA.
. . the national well-being and security as determined by
the Congress and the President demand consideration
before an injunction should issue for a NEPA violation.
Accordingly, courts have undertaken an evaluation of
competing public interests in molding permanent injunctive
relief for NEPA violators. A court should tailor its relief
to fit each particular case, balancing the environmental
concerns of NEPA against the larger interests of society
that might be adversely affected by an overbroad
injunction. '7
Some commentators argue that the global nature of environmental
problems necessitate resolution by diplomatic means.'" They argue that
extraterritorial application of NEPA would be an attempt to supplant existing
international law mechanisms, some of which, such as improved multilateral,
development bank environmental policies, stem from successful persuasion,
and not unilateral demand.'7 6  There may still be a role for NEPA
internationally, since the agreements reached by consensus are often vague
172. Id.
173. Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1984).
174. Id.
175. Whitney, supra note 164.
176. Id.
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and indefinite.'" Such agreements often take years to reach, and proponents
of extraterritorial application point to NEPA as a ready solution."8
VI. CONCLUSION
Most industrialized nations already have policies similar to those
entailed in NEPA. Thus, it is mainly in the industrialized/donor country-
undeveloped/recipient country scenario that the issue of disparate
environmental regimes arises. Developing nations are faced with a bit of a
conundrum in formulating their development programs. Essentially, only
three strategies are available to these countries with respect to compliance
with environmental protocols, whether they stem from application of NEPA
or some obligation under domestic or international law. These options are to
simply ignore any environmental obligations, to borrow in order to afford the
added costs of compliance with a regime such as NEPA, or to finance
compliance through internal growth. Since environmental standards will have
a direct impact on the goods and jobs which would stem from a development
project, as well as the level of foreign exchange required, relatively weak
environmental regimes may foster robust economic growth."' Case law
shows that application of NEPA does not necessarily mean that more
stringent environmental guidelines become part of the planning process.
The extraterritorial application of NEPA is still unclear. Case law
gives more guidance with respect to issues of standing than it does to NEPA's
reach. Executive Order 12,114 did not adequately clarify the situation and
raised certain constitutional issues which must be worked out. An outright
amendment to NEPA would achieve a definite answer, but in recent years
such efforts have been unsuccessful. Consequently, the evolution of NEPA's
extraterritorial reach will probably take the form of continued Congressional
tinkering with the CEQ requirements. The EIA Convention signifies that at
some point, both the utilization of the EIA mechanism and standards thereof
will become a general principle of customary international law, hence binding
on all nations. Until that time, however, the courts must perform complex
analysis of the competing factors outlined in this paper. This will most likely
mean continued deference to the foreign policy views of the State Department
and of the Executive Branch over the environmental concerns addressed in
NEPA.
177. Stanley W. Spracker & Ethan S. Naftalin, Applying Procedural Requirements of U.S.
Environmental Laws to Foreign Ventures: A Growing Challenge to Business, 25 INT'L L. 1043
(1991).
178. Id.
179. Extraterritorial Environmental Regulation, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1609 (1991).
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